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INTRODUCTION

While promoting a new book this past spring,' retired justice John Paul Stevens sat down for interviews with Jeffrey
Toobin of the New Yorker and Adam Liptak of the New York
Times.2 In both conversations, Stevens sharply criticized the ruling that the US Supreme Court had handed down a few weeks

earlier in McCutcheon v Federal Election Commission.3 In that
case, Alabama businessman Shaun McCutcheon challenged federal aggregate limits on how much an individual may contribute
during an election cycle to all federal candidates nationwide and
to certain political committees.4 Those limits had prevented
McCutcheon from donating as much money as he would have
liked to a variety of political committees and to individuals running for Congress in states and districts other than his own.5 By
a 5-4 vote, the Court struck down the aggregate limits, holding
that they violated McCutcheon's and other would-be campaign
donors' First Amendment rights.6
In Stevens's view, the trouble with McCutcheon began with
the ruling's first sentence. Writing for the plurality, Chief Justice John Roberts opened with a declaration: "There is no right
more basic in our democracy than the right to participate in
electing our political leaders."7 Toobin recounted Stevens's
criticism:
t

H. Blair and Joan V. White Chair in Civil Litigation, University of Iowa College

of Law.

1 See John Paul Stevens, Six Amendments: How and Why We Should Change the

Constitution (Little, Brown 2014).
2

See Adam Liptak, Justice Stevens Suggests Solution for 'Giant Step in the Wrong

Direction',NY Times A14 (Apr 21, 2014); Jeffrey Toobin, I Told You So, New Yorker 20
(Apr 28, 2014).
3 134 S Ct 1434 (2014).
4
Id at 1442-43 (Roberts) (plurality).
5 Id at 1443 (Roberts) (plurality).
6
Id at 1462 (Roberts) (plurality).
7 McCutcheon, 134 S Ct at 1440-41 (Roberts) (plurality).
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"It's a grossly incorrect decision," Stevens said. "The very
first sentence of the Chief Justice's opinion lays out a basic
error in this whole jurisprudence. He says that there is 'no
right more basic in our democracy' than to pick our elected
officials. But the case is not about whether individuals can
pick their own congressmen. It's about giving lots of campaign contributions, picking other people's congressmen, not
your own."8
Liptak recounted a similar exchange: "Mr. McCutcheon was not
trying to participate in electing his own leaders, Justice Stevens
said. 'The opinion is all about a case where the issue was electing somebody else's representatives,' he said."9
The Court's rulings in McCutcheon and Citizens United v
Federal Election Commissiono have sparked fierce disagreements about a host of matters ranging from whether restrictions
on campaign contributions and expenditures are in fact restrictions on speech, to whether the First Amendment grants
equivalent speech rights to corporations and natural persons, to
the kinds of governmental objectives that can justify restrictions
on campaign spending. Regardless of the position that one takes
in those debates, I would like to ask readers to assume for a few
moments that the Roberts Court's rulings on those issues are
grounded in a sound reading of the First Amendment. With
those contested pieces of the campaign-finance puzzle held momentarily in place, I want to focus on Roberts's first sentence in
McCutcheon and on Stevens's critique of it. The disagreement
manifest in that exchange raises provocative issues on its own.
By contributing to candidates in states and districts other than
his own, was McCutcheon indeed trying to influence the selection of other people's representatives? If so, should that affect
our First Amendment appraisal of his actions?
In Part I of this essay, I argue that Stevens's criticism of
McCutcheon's opening line is at odds with the understanding of
American federalism that Stevens championed while on the
Court and is far more compatible with a conception of federalism
that he explicitly rejected. In Part II, I evaluate McCutcheon's
widely dispersed campaign contributions through the federalism
8 Toobin, I Told You So, New Yorker at 20 (cited in note 2).
9 Liptak, Justice Stevens Suggests Solution for 'Giant Step in the Wrong Direction',
NY Times at A14 (cited in note 2).
10 558 US 310 (2010) (striking down federal limits on corporations' independent political expenditures).
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lens that Stevens now endorses. I contend that, even if one posits that McCutcheon was trying to influence the selection of other people's representatives, any effort to restrict his and other
long-armed donors' campaign spending on those grounds would
face an uphill First Amendment battle.
I. VISIONS OF FEDERALISM
Was McCutcheon meddling in the selection of other people's
representatives? Nearly two decades ago, the Court indicated
how it would answer such a question, though it did so with a
voting lineup that is unexpected in light of Justice Stevens's criticism of McCutcheon. In 1995, Stevens wrote for a five-member
majority in U.S. Term Limits, Inc v Thornton.11 At issue in that
case was an amendment to the Arkansas Constitution that
barred both placing a person's name on a ballot for election to
the US House of Representatives if he or she had already held
one of Arkansas's seats in that chamber for three or more terms
and placing a person s name on a ballot for election to the US
Senate if he or she had already held one of Arkansas's seats for
two or more terms. 12 The majority held that the Arkansas
amendment was unconstitutional, while Justice Clarence
Thomas led those taking the contrary view.13 The justices' debate about first principles will bring us back to McCutcheon in
short order.
Joined by Justices Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer, Stevens determined that
allowing Arkansas to add qualifications beyond the age, citizenship, and residency requirements prescribed by the US Constitution would disregard "the revolutionary character of the Government that the Framers conceived."14 When the Framers
adopted the Constitution, Stevens wrote, they
envisioned a uniform national system, rejecting the notion
that the Nation was a collection of States, and instead

11 514 US 779 (1995).

Id at 784.
13 Compare id at 845 (Stevens) (majority) ("[T]he Arkansas enactment ... exceeds
the boundaries of the Constitution."), with id (Thomas dissenting) ("The Constitution is
simply silent on this question.").
14 Id at 803 (Stevens) (majority). See also US Const Art I, § 2, cl 2 (establishing age,
citizenship, and residency requirements for members of the House); US Const Art I, § 3,
cl 3 (establishing age, citizenship, and residency requirements for members of the Senate).
12
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creating a direct link between the National Government and
the people of the United States. In that National Government, representatives owe primary allegiance not to the
people of a State, but to the people of the Nation. . . . Repre-

sentatives and Senators are as much officers of the entire
Union as is the President.15
Unlike a legislative body akin to the one that existed under the
Articles of Confederation, Stevens explained, "[t]he Congress of
the United States . . . is not a confederation of nations in which

separate sovereigns are represented by appointed delegates, but
is instead a body composed of representatives of the people."16
Congress, he reiterated, is "a uniform national body representing the interests of a single people."17 The Court concluded that
allowing individual states to impose term limits or other qualifications for congressional office would "undermin[e] the uniformity and the national character that the Framers envisioned and
sought to ensure" and would "sever the direct link that the
Framers found so critical between the National Government and
the people of the United States."18 Kennedy filed a concurring
opinion to underscore his conviction that the Constitution creates "two orders of government, each with its own direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual rights and obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed by it."19
Joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices
Sandra Day O'Connor and Antonin Scalia in dissent, Thomas
advanced a fundamentally different conception of the American
constitutional system. According to these justices, the American
people do not have a direct, unmediated relationship with the
entire national government. Pointing out that the Constitution
requires citizens to act through their individual states whenever
15
U.S. Term Limits, Inc, 514 US at 803 (citation omitted). The majority view was
bolstered by the fact that the Constitution "gives the representatives of all the people the
final say in judging the qualifications of the representatives of any one State" and by the
fact that the Constitution requires payment of representatives' and senators' salaries
from the US Treasury. Id at 804. See also US Const Art I, § 5, cl 1 ("Each House shall be
the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members."); US Const
Art I, § 6, cl 1 ("The Senators and Representatives shall ... [be] paid out of the Treasury
of the United States.").
16
U.S. Term Limits, Inc, 514 US at 821.
17 Id at 822.
18 Id.
19 Id at 838 (Kennedy concurring) ("The Framers split the atom of sovereignty. It
was the genius of their idea that our citizens would have two political capacities, one
state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the other.").
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they wish to elect congressional representatives, choose a president, or amend the Constitution, Thomas argued that "[t]he
Constitution simply does not recognize any mechanism for action by the undifferentiated people of the Nation."20 For that and
other reasons, he rejected the majority's contention that "each
Member of Congress has a nationwide constituency."21 The
Framers did indeed establish a direct link between members of
Congress and the people, Thomas wrote, but that link was between members of Congress and the people of those members'
respective states:
When the people of Georgia pick their representatives in
Congress, they are acting as the people of Georgia, not as
the corporate agents for the undifferentiated people of the
Nation as a whole.
[T]he people of Georgia have no say over whom the people of
Massachusetts select to represent them in Congress. This
arrangement must baffle the majority, whose understanding of Congress would surely fit more comfortably within a
system of nationwide elections.22
If the people of Arkansas wished to impose qualifications in addition to those established by the US Constitution for that
state's allotment of seats in the House and Senate, the dissenters concluded, it was no one else's business.23
Taking Stevens's and Thomas's opposing opinions as our
guides, let us return to our question: When a donor in one state
or district contributes to the campaign of a Senate or House
candidate in another state or district, is the donor trying to influence the selection of somebody else's representatives? If the
understanding of American federalism that Stevens advanced in
U.S. Term Limits, Inc is embraced, then jurisdictional boundaries fade into irrelevance when identifying congressional constituencies-just as they fade into irrelevance when identifying
those to whom the president owes his or her allegiance-and
there are very real ways in which an Alabama resident is represented by, say, a senator from Montana. If, instead, Thomas's
U.S. Term Limits, Inc, 514 US at 848-49 (Thomas dissenting).
Id at 857 (Thomas dissenting).
22 Id at 858-60 (Thomas dissenting).
23 See id at 860 (Thomas dissenting) ("[W]hen it comes to the selection of Members
of Congress, the people of each State have retained their independent political identity.").
20
21
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understanding of our federal system is adopted, then senators
and congresspersons elected by the people of Montana represent
only the people of that state and not, say, also the people of
Alabama.
It thus comes as a surprise to hear Stevens insist that
McCutcheon was about "picking other people's congressmen, not
your own."24 The evident conflict in his views on term limits and
campaign finance may explain why Breyer and Ginsburg-two
of the five members of the U.S. Term Limits, Inc majoritymade no effort in McCutcheon to draw legal or rhetorical support
from the fact that a campaign donor was trying to influence races in states and districts that he did not inhabit.25 Neither did
the Government in its briefs.26 As for Kennedy, he took precisely
the position in McCutcheon that-all else being equal-his views
in U.S. Term Limits, Inc would have led one to predict: any
American can claim any member of Congress as his or her own
and can direct his or her campaign contributions accordingly.
II. REGULATING LONG-ARMED CAMPAIGN SPENDING
But what if Justice Stevens got it wrong in U.S. Term Limits, Inc and Justice Thomas got it right, such that McCutcheon
was indeed trying to influence the selection of other people's
representatives? Is it clear that we could then regard McCutcheon and other long-armed donors as meddlers, and that regulators could justifiably treat them less favorably than those who
keep their money close to home?
The Implications of § 441e and Bluman u FederalElection
Commission27

A.

A good starting point for considering that question is provided by 2 USC § 441e, the federal statute barring foreign nationals from making campaign contributions or electioneering

Toobin, I Told You So, New Yorker at 20 (cited in note 2).
Joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan in dissent,
Breyer principally argued that the other five justices had taken far too narrow a view of
political corruption and had underestimated the risk that donors and politicians would
circumvent federally imposed (and here unchallenged) base limits on campaign contributions. See McCutcheon, 134 S Ct at 1466-78 (Breyer dissenting).
26 See generally Brief for Appellee Federal Election Commission, McCutcheon u
Federal Election Commission, Docket No 12-536 (US filed July 18, 2013) (available on
Westlaw at 2013 WL 3773847).
27 800 F Supp 2d 281 (DDC 2011), affd, 132 S Ct 1087 (2012).
24
25
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expenditures in local, state, and national elections.28 In Citizens
United, the Court expressly reserved judgment on § 441e's constitutionality,29 but it has since (in a fashion) resolved the issue.
In Bluman, the US District Court for the District of Columbia
sustained § 441e against a First Amendment challenge brought
by a citizen of Canada and a citizen of Israel both of whom were
in the United States on temporary visas. 30 The plaintiffs in that
case both resided in New York State; one wished to make financial contributions to the campaigns of federal candidates in New
York State and Washington State, while the other wished to
contribute to the campaign of a federal candidate in Oklahoma.31
The court reasoned that the statute could survive even strict
scrutiny because the government has a compelling interest in
preventing foreign nationals from participating in "activities of
democratic self-government."32 The kinds of spending barred by
§ 441e, the court said, "are an integral aspect of the process by
which Americans elect officials to federal, state, and local government offices."33 The plaintiffs tried to leverage the fact that,
under federal law, "many groups of people who are not entitled
to vote may nonetheless make contributions and expenditures
related to elections-for example, minors, American corporations, and citizens of states or municipalities other than the
state or municipality of the elective office."34 The court, however,
was unpersuaded, stating that "minors, American corporations,
and citizens of other states and municipalities are all members
of the American political community."35
The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the district
court's ruling in January 2012 in a fourteen-word order.36 The
28 See 2 USC § 441e (2012). See also 2 USC § 434(f)(3) (defining "electioneering
communication").
29 See Citizens United, 558 US at 362 ("We need not reach the question whether the
Government has a compelling interest in preventing foreign individuals or associations
from influencing our Nation's political process.").
30 Bluman, 800 F Supp 2d at 282-83, 85.

31

Id at 285.

32

Id at 288.

33
34

Id.

Bluman, 800 F Supp 2d at 290.
Id.
See Bluman u Federal Election Commission, 132 S Ct 1087, 1087 (2012) ("Appeal
from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Judgment affirmed.").
From the perspective of Citizens Uniteds critics, the Court's decision to summarily affirm-rather than hear oral arguments and issue a fully reasoned decision-is unsurprising. See, for example, Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 Mich L Rev 581, 605-10 (2011) (arguing that one can endorse § 441e's
35
36
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justices' views about the case's implications for Americans' crossborder campaign spending thus remain a matter of speculation.
Stevens believes, however, that Bluman's implications are clear.
In testimony before the Senate Rules and Administration Committee this past spring, he argued that the door is invitingly
open for federal and state lawmakers to impose restrictions on
long-armed campaign spending:
[R]ules limiting campaign contributions and expenditures
should recognize the distinction between money provided by
their constituents and money provided by non-voters, such
as corporations and people living in other jurisdictions. [He
then briefly summarized Bluman.] Similar reasoning would
justify the State of Michigan placing restrictions on campaign expenditures made by residents of Wisconsin or Indiana without curtailing their speech about general issues.
Voters' fundamental right to participate in electing their
own political leaders is far more compelling than the right
of non-voters such as corporations and non-residents to
support or oppose candidates for public office. The Bluman
case illustrates that the interest in protecting campaign
speech by non-voters is less worthy of protection than the
interest in protecting speech about general issues. 37
In his recent book, Stevens similarly argues that "[u]nlimited
expenditures by nonvoters in election campaigns ... impairs
[sic] the process of democratic self-government by making successful candidates more beholden to the nonvoters who supported them than to the voters who elected them."38
That argument certainly has plausible foundations. States
and the federal government share a strong constitutional interest in preserving a republican form of government for each of the
states. 39 Recognizing "the choice, and right, of the people to be
governed by their citizen peers," the Court has held, for example, that states may exclude foreign nationals from

constitutionality and embrace all the Court's reasoning in Citizens United only through
doctrinal incoherence).
37 Dollars and Sense: How Undisclosed Money and Post-McCutcheon Campaign

Finance Will Affect the 2014 Election and Beyond, Hearing on Campaign Finance before
the Senate Rules and Administration Committee, 113th Cong, 2d Sess 3-5 (2014) (statement of retired US Supreme Court justice John Paul Stevens).
38 Stevens, Six Amendments at 78 (cited in note 1).
39 See US Const Art IV, § 4, cl 1 ("The United States shall guarantee to every State
in this Union a Republican Form of Government.").
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governmental positions that involve "discretionary decisionmaking, or execution of policy, which substantially affects members
of the political community."40 To a point, the Court has recognized that actionable threats to the self-governance of states and
municipalities can also come from American citizens. In Pope v
Williams,41 for example, the Court held that a state may withhold voting privileges from individuals who refuse to declare an
intention to become residents of that state. 42 In Holt Civic Club v
City of Tuscaloosa,43 the Court allowed a city to withhold the
franchise from nearby nonresidents who had a strong interest in
some of that city's policies.44 The Court declared that "no one
would suggest" that a person has a constitutional right to vote in
a city's elections merely because he or she is affected by some of
that city's actions.45
Stevens would extend such cases' reasoning to allow states
to shield their elections from the influence of out-of-state campaign spending. Yet there is a big difference between saying that
a state may refuse to allow an American nonresident to cast a
ballot on Election Day and saying that a state may refuse to allow an American nonresident to use campaign contributions or
expenditures to speak to that state's voters about favored or disfavored candidates. To appreciate the magnitude of this difference, simply consider what the Court can realistically be expected to say about the voting rights of corporations. The
Roberts Court has strongly protected the right of corporations to
make independent political expenditures, but do many seriously
believe that the Court is poised to declare that each American
corporation has a constitutional right to send an emissary to
cast a ballot on Election Day? Such visions are the stuff of rhetoric, not reality.46

Foley u Connelie, 435 US 291, 296 (1978).
193 US 621 (1904).
42 See id at 633-34.
43 439 US 60 (1978).
44 See id at 68-70.
45 Id at 69.
46 See, for example, Citizens United, 558 US at 424-25 (Stevens dissenting) ("Under the majority's view, I suppose it may be a First Amendment problem that corporations are not permitted to vote, given that voting is, among other things, a form of
speech."); Lyle Denniston, Analysis: The Personhoodof Corporations,SCOTUSblog (Jan
21, 2010), online at http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/01/analysis-the-personhood-ofcorporations (visited Sept 6, 2014) (arguing that Stevens made a powerful point and that
"[i]t does not matter that the right-to-vote scenario is quite implausible").
40
41
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Obstacles to Regulation

Scholars and lawmakers should, and likely will, consider
the merits of Stevens's proposal at length. I wish here to simply
sketch the contours of a few of the formidable obstacles that
those who favor restrictions on long-armed campaign spending
must overcome.
1. Bluman's signals.
Bluman sends mixed signals about restrictions on out-ofstate spending by American citizens. The district court's emphasis on democratic integrity does suggest that states may regard
campaign contributions from nonresidents as a threat to their
own self-governance, no matter the donors' nationalities. The
state of Iowa, for example, might regard out-of-state campaign
spending as a threat to its self-governance regardless of whether
the funds come from a Canadian or a Californian. Yet when the
Bluman plaintiffs argued that they were no different from
Americans who wish to financially support candidates in states
and cities in which they are not permitted to vote, the court
dismissed the comparison by defining the self-governing community in national terms. 47 On that line of thinking, Americans'
membership in the national political community entitles them to
wield a nationwide financial influence in elections of all kinds.
2.

Cultural realities.

Restricting long-armed campaign spending would conflict
with the norms and practices of our evolving political culture.
Put differently, if we are to abide by the proverb that only the
blameless may cast stones, 48 the queue for lobbing stones at
long-armed donors is much shorter than one might initially suppose. Cross-border political activity is a long-standing and growing feature of our political system. 49 Anyone who is old enough to
See notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
See John 8:7 (King James Version) ("He that is without sin among you, let him
first cast a stone at her.").
49 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 Harv L Rev 1077, 1135
(2014) ("In recent years, political engagement across state lines has increased dramatically."); Zephyr Teachout, ExtraterritorialElectioneeringand the Globalization of American Elections, 27 Berkeley J Intl L 162, 164 (2009) ("While some out-of-state fundraising
has been occurring for years, the scale has dramatically increased recently with the
growth of the Internet, making it much easier for out-of-state donors and activist [sic] to
track and support candidates.").
47

48
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vote and has been even marginally active in mainstream party
politics has almost certainly received letters, telephone calls, or
emails from national political committees that warn of enemy
encroachment in one part of the country or another and urgently
request financial support. The nation's political action committees (PACs), super PACs, and politically active nonprofitsincluding MoveOn.Org for those on the left, Crossroads GPS for
those on the right, longstanding players like NARAL Pro-Choice
America and the National Rifle Association, and seemingly
countless others-provide donors large and small with opportunities to bring nationwide financial resources to bear in targeted
races.5 0 No matter the size of their donations, those who have
contributed to such entities have spent money to influence the
outcome of elections in jurisdictions in which they do not reside
and cannot vote.
And out-of-state donors have contributed for good and varied reasons. Securing victory in one's own state or district will do
little to advance one's national legislative agenda if a majority of
the country chooses leaders with substantially different objectives. If one's political identity is bound up with that of the nation, one has strong social-psychological incentives to secure
congressional leadership that is compatible with one's own preferences. 51 Those who regard themselves as geographically mobile
have an incentive to try to ensure that they will be comfortable
with the prevailing regulatory regime no matter where they ultimately reside.52 Moreover, as Professor Jessica Bulman-Pozen
50 For additional examples ranging from a Washington State-based company that
has contributed to an Alaska-focused PAC, to a Florida-based venture capitalist who has
contributed to a Kentucky-focused PAC, to two Ohio-based nonprofits that attacked a
Senate candidate in a Georgia primary, to Senate Majority PAC's well-financed efforts in
numerous races across the country, see Ian Vandewalker, Election Spending 2014: Nine
Toss-up Senate Races, Brennan Center for Justice (Brennan Center for Justice at New
York
University
School
of
Law
Aug
18,
2014),
online
at
http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/election-spending-2014-nine-toss-up-senate-races
(visited Sept 6, 2014).

51

See Todd E. Pettys, Sodom's Shadow: The Uncertain Line between Public and

Private Morality, 61 Hastings L J 1161, 1194-99 (2010) (describing the "integration thesis," and arguing that "citizens frequently do perceive that, by virtue of their integration
with a political community, their individual well-being is affected by the presence or absence of certain kinds of conduct within those geopolitical borders").
52 See Todd E. Pettys, The Mobility Paradox,92 Georgetown L J 481, 502-05 (2004)
(arguing that, because geographically mobile citizens cannot predict all the places that
they will one day live and focus their lobbying resources there, they have an incentive to
try to "maximize the likelihood that they will be happy no matter where in the nation
their life circumstances take them" by seeking federal legislation that embodies their
preferences).
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has perceptively pointed out, Americans can, through crossborder political engagement, "seek to create momentum for a
particular policy or political party, to build a real-life example to
inform national debate,

. .

. to take comfort in knowing that their

preferences are actual policy-and their partisan group is in
control-somewhere,"53 as well as affiliate with other subnational jurisdictions when they feel politically alienated from their
own. 54 Many of these incentives not only push people into federal
politics, but they drive people to get involved in other jurisdictions' state and local electoral battles as well.55 The various incentives that drive so many donors-large and small, on the left
and on the right-to extend their reach beyond their own locales
are among the incentives that, to date, have evidently discouraged citizens from launching a major movement against longarmed political activity.56 Declaring such reforms both permissible and desirable would mark a substantial change in our
political culture.57
3. The Roberts Court's doctrinal trajectory.
Bearing in mind our resolve not to quarrel here with the
Roberts Court's assembly of other portions of the campaignfinance puzzle,58 current First Amendment doctrine is plainly
hostile to laws aimed at restricting long-armed campaign activity. Restrictions on independent expenditures are especially
Bulman-Pozen, 127 Harv L Rev at 1136 (cited in note 49).
See id at 1140-42.
55 See Anthony Johnstone, Outside Influence, 13 Election L J 117, 118 (2014) (citing
examples of "outside influence" in recall elections, petition circulation, ballot-issue campaigns, lobbying, and other instances of legislative democracy).
56 Of course, the fact that out-of-state money commonly finds its way into electoral
campaigns of all kinds does not mean that in-state and out-of-state spending are always
politically fungible. Those who are disadvantaged by an influx of out-of-state money can
try to boost their votes by making a campaign issue out of the matter, warning that
meddling outsiders lacking local values are trying to dictate how business is done here at
home. See id at 117-18 (citing examples of distaste for outsiders, such as the Reconstruction-era epithet "carpetbagger"). But the threat posed by this characterization evidently
does little to deter such spending.
57 Alaska and Hawaii are reportedly the only states that place restrictions on outof-state campaign contributions, and no state restricts out-of-state expenditures. See
Alaska Stat Ann § 15.13.072(a), (e) (2013); Hawaii Rev Stat § 11-362 (2013). See also
Bulman-Pozen, 127 Harv L Rev at 1137 (cited in note 49). Federal courts have struck
down limits on out-of-state campaign contributions in other states on First Amendment
grounds. See, for example, Landell v Sorrell, 382 F3d 91, 146-48 (2d Cir 2004), revd and
remd on other grounds, Randall v Sorrell, 548 US 230 (2006); VanNatta v Keisling, 151
F3d 1215, 1217-18 (9th Cir 1998).
58 See text accompanying note 10.
53
54
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vulnerable to First Amendment attacks because they draw the
Court's most demanding level of scrutiny. 9 Whether campaign
contributions warrant the same strict scrutiny remains debated
in some quarters; the Court's current (though perhaps faltering)
wisdom is that they do not.60 But even if the Court continues to
apply a somewhat more lenient standard, it is clear that the
Court's mode of inquiry is still "rigorous" and far removed from
mere rational-basis review. 6 1 There are strong reasons to doubt
that the Court would find that restrictions on out-of-state campaign spending can be justified by sufficiently powerful
governmental interests.
Citizens United, in particular, provides a treasure trove of
reasons why the Court is likely to find such restrictions unconstitutional. Writing for the five-member majority in that watershed case, Justice Kennedy strongly condemned speech restrictions that "distinguish[ ] among different speakers, allowing
speech by some but not others."62 The American political process
demands "that voters must be free to obtain information from
diverse sources in order to determine how to cast their votes,"
the Court said, so lawmakers cannot "deprive the public of the
right and privilege to determine for itself what speech and
speakers are worthy of consideration."63 With the exception of
corporate-speech precedent that it proceeded to overturn, the
Court stressed that it had never "allowed the exclusion of a class
of speakers from the general public dialogue."64 Kennedy
59 See Buckley u Valeo, 424 US 1, 44-45 (1976) (noting "the exacting scrutiny applicable to limitations on core First Amendment rights of political expression").
60 See id at 20-21 (concluding that restrictions on contributions infringe less severely on First Amendment freedoms than do restrictions on expenditures). In McCutcheon, the Republican National Committee urged the Court to abandon the constitutional
distinction between contributions and expenditures and to apply strict scrutiny to both.
See Brief on the Merits for Appellant Republican National Committee, McCutcheon a
Federal Election Commission, Docket No 12-536, *6-7 (US filed May 6, 2013) (available
on Westlaw at 2013 WL 1923314). The plurality in McCutcheon found it unnecessary to
"parse the differences between the two standards," noting that the aggregate limits could
not be sustained even under the somewhat less demanding of the two. McCutcheon, 134
S Ct at 1446 (Roberts) (plurality). Justice Thomas refused to join the plurality opinion
precisely because he believed that strict scrutiny should be deployed for restrictions on
contributions and expenditures alike. See id at 1462-64 (Thomas concurring in the
judgment).
61 McCutcheon, 134 S Ct at 1444 (Roberts) (plurality), quoting Buckley, 424 US at
29.
62 Citizens United, 558 US at 340 ("Speech restrictions based on the identity of the
speaker are all too often simply a means to control content.").
63 Id at 341.
64 Id.
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emphatically summed up the point: "When Government seeks to
use its full power . . . to command where a person may get his or

her information or what distrusted source he or she may not
hear, it uses censorship to control thought. This is unlawful. The
First Amendment confirms the freedom to think for ourselves."65
That logic can readily be applied in defense of those Americans who wish to exert a financial influence on other states' elections. It applies most directly, of course, to independent expenditures-the type of spending that was at issue in Citizens United.
Why should a state's voters not be permitted to hear what interested outsiders have to say about the candidates whose names
will appear on those voters' ballots and then decide for themselves whether those views are persuasive? Citizens United's
logic also has force in the realm of campaign contributions. Why
should a candidate not be permitted to associate with outsiders
for the purpose of producing campaign messages, leaving voters
free to decide for themselves what they think of those messages
and-provided that there is an adequate donor-disclosure regime in place-whether the candidate's association with those
long-armed donors is itself politically meaningful?
Of course, one could ask those same questions regarding the
foreign nationals in Bluman. But if the Court is pressed to reconcile its affirmance in that case with the strong opposition that
it expressed to speaker-based restrictions in Citizens United, it
is difficult to imagine that the Court would deal a major blow to
Citizens United's central logic. Even if a majority of the justices
now generally embrace the understanding of American federalism put forward by Thomas in his U.S. Term Limits, Inc dissent,6 6 the smart money is on Bluman, not Citizens United, getting painted into a corner. The Court might say, for example,
that, when it comes to making campaign contributions and electioneering expenditures in domestic elections (rather than supplementing the Constitution's qualifications for seats in the
House and Senate), the First Amendment renders the relevant
political community national in scope. In support of that conclusion, the Court might say that, because American citizens are
highly mobile and are interconnected in countless political, economic, technological, cultural, and familial ways, it is vital that
they remain free to speak and associate across state lines in

65
66

Id at 356.
See notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
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order to shape political leadership at all levels of government.
Even if Bluman's fit with Citizens United ultimately remains
uncomfortable, the Court's decision to issue a two-word affirmance in the former seems only to confirm that the justices are
unlikely to rethink a central piece of Citizens United.
Among the governmental objectives that might be invoked
to justify restrictions aimed specifically at long-armed campaign
spending, the leading contender is the self-governance rationale
that Stevens identified: if a state's elected officials feel more indebted to the outsiders who provided direct or indirect financial
support than they do to the individuals who voted on Election
Day, then that state's representative system of government may
be threatened.67 That argument comes perilously close, however,
to suffering from the same vulnerabilities as the anticorruption
and antidistortion rationales that the Court rejected in Citizens
United. The Court in that case said that money might secure
"[i]ngratiation and access," but those are not sufficient bases to
curb campaign speech because they "are not corruption."68 The
fact that campaign spending is aimed at persuading voters to
cast their ballots in a particular way, Kennedy wrote, presupposes the reality "that the people have the ultimate influence
over elected officials."69 With respect to the Government's fear
that wealth-amassing donors (corporations, in that case) would
produce huge amounts of democracy-distorting speech, the Court
stated that this was simply a different way of trying to justify
the kind of speaker-based, information-limiting speech restriction that the First Amendment forbids.70
The stage is thus advantageously set for those who would
resist restrictions on long-armed campaign spending. What is
the constitutionally redressable problem, long-armed donors' attorneys will ask, if an out-of-state individual wins access to another state's elected leaders by making campaign contributions
and expenditures? The power to retain or discard those elected
officials still rests in the hands of the voters who must ultimately appraise their leaders' performance. Moreover, so far as direct
campaign contributions are concerned, out-of-state donors will
be subject to the same base limits that in-state donors face-and
67 For a sympathetic discussion of this argument, see Garrick B. Pursley, The
CampaignFinance Safeguards of Federalism, 63 Emory L J 781, 820-28 (2014).
68 Citizens United, 558 US at 360.
69 Id.
70 See id at 349-56.

Published by Chicago Unbound, 2017

15

University of Chicago Law Review Online, Vol. 81 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 4

The University of Chicago Law Review Dialogue

92

[81:77

if contributions at or below those limits do not unacceptably
skew candidates' loyalties when in-state donors make them,
then why should it be different when the money comes from beyond the state's borders? Again, it is the state's voters-not the
donors-who must ultimately decide whether the elected officials are performing satisfactorily, and voters can send their
leaders packing when they perceive that those leaders' loyalties
have drifted. Section 441e does nip at the heels of that argument, but the district court in Bluman has already signaled how
those difficulties might be waved away-namely, by determining
that, when it comes to campaign spending, the First Amendment simply does not provide foreign nationals and members of
the American political community with equivalent levels of protection. That approach clearly chafes against Citizens United's
unqualified condemnation of speaker-based restrictions on expressive freedoms, but by affirming the district court's ruling in
Bluman, the Court has already signaled that it is likely willing
to abide this tension.
CONCLUSION

Was Shaun McCutcheon trying to pick "other people's congressmen,"71 as Justice Stevens charged, or was he trying to pick
his own? Under the vision of federalism that Stevens endorsed
on behalf of a majority of the Court nearly twenty years ago,
McCutcheon was trying to choose his own leaders. As Stevens
explained in 1995, regardless of the state within which they live,
each congressperson has a direct relationship with each American. If that is the view of federalism that one holds, state borders should be irrelevant to determining whether long-armed
American donors' campaign spending in congressional elections
is, in whole or in part, constitutionally proscribable.
Even if one takes the contrary view of our federal system
and posits that senators and representatives represent only the
states and districts from which they come, the First Amendment
stands as an obstacle to concluding that long-armed donors'
campaign activities may be uniquely restricted. Absent a dramatic shift, Citizens United and other increasingly entrenched
features of our political culture strongly suggest that crossborder campaign spending is here to stay.

71

See note 8 and accompanying text.
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